1	STATE OF MICHIGAN
2	IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF MARQUETTE
3	FREDERICK NANNESTAD,
4	Plaintiff,
5	vs. File No. 12-050920-AW
6	REPUBLIC TOWNSHIP SUPERVISOR GARY JOHNSON, REPUBLIC TOWNSHIP
7	CLERK MARILYN BRANCHEAU, and CURRENT REPUBLIC TOWNSHIP TREASURER KRISTINA KOSKI,
9	Defendants.
10	/
11	MOTION HEARING (partial transcript - ruling only)
12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE THOMAS L. SOLKA
13	Marquette, Michigan - Thursday, October 10, 2013
14	APPEARANCES:
15	For the Plaintiff: Mr. Daniel D. Mead (P68793)
16	Graybill & Mead, P.L.L.C. 216 South Main Street
17	Ishpeming, MI 49849 (906)485-6420
18	For the Defendant: Mr. David R. Mechlin (P17578)
19	Vairo, Mechlin & Tomasi, P.L.L.C. 400 East Houghton Avenue Houghton, MI 49931
20	(906) 482-07770
21	
22	
23	RECORDED BY: JAVS Video Courtroom TRANSCRIBED BY: Sharon A. Grabarczyk, CER 6727
24	NORTHERN REPORTERS P.O. Box 27
25	Marquette, MI 49855 (906)226-2706

1	Marquette, Michigan
2	Thursday, October 10, 2013 - 1:40 p.m.
3	(From 1:40 until 3:28 p.m., proceeding
4	recorded, but not transcribed.)
5	THE COURT: All right. We are back and
6	continuing on the record in the in File 50920-AW, in
7	the matter of Frederick Nannestad versus Republic
8	Township Supervisor Gary Johnson, the township clerk,
9	Marilyn Brancheau, the former Republic Township
10	Treasurer, Faye Mattila, and the current Republic
11	Township Treasurer, Kristina Koski. Now, this is a
12	mandamus and a declaratory judgment claim against the
13	township officers, current and one former township
14	officer, its former treasurer. Mr. Mead?
15	MR. MEAD: She's been dismissed, Your Honor,
16	the former treasurer, Ms. Mattila.
17	THE COURT: All right. Well, I guess there
18	was a voluntary or stipulated dismissal as to
19	Ms. Mattila, so the current township officers.
20	Now, as I said, the township officers are
21	officers of Republic Township. That's a small
22	township, of which the Court will take judicial notice,
23	in western Marquette County. Its 2010 census
24	population I believe was about 570 people, with a
25	median household income of about \$23,532. The

plaintiff in this case, Mr. Frederick Nannestad, is a citizen, a taxpayer, and a resident, one of those residents of the township.

Now, before the Court today for decision are counter-motions for summary disposition on the complaint. One motion was filed by the plaintiff here, asking that the Court grant the relief he requests by way of a mandamus order and declaratory relief, and the other motion, the counter-motion, is that filed by the township asking the Court to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff does also ask leave to file an amended complaint, depending on the Court's decision on the summary disposition motion.

Now, the complaint before the Court, this one for a writ of mandamus, was filed November 16 of 2012. The declaratory relief addendum to the complaint, or I believe what one of the counsel has referred to in an argument as the "wherefore" clause -- I think it's still called the addendum. That's what it was called when I started practicing law, but that was a long time ago, and maybe it's changed. But the relief requested clause for the complaint asks this Court to declare, on a declaratory relief clause, the obvious, that these township offices are required to comply with state law, and I might add their oaths of office, specifically

1 laws detailing their duties of office in relation to
2 township records.

Now, the statutes cited of course are the specific statutes as to each officer, 41.62 for the township supervisor, 41.78 for the treasurer, and MCL 41.65 for the clerk. The other statute cited in the complaint is MCL 399.5, which deals with state records -- well, records of all state agencies and subdivisions of the state in relation to their duty -- duties as to those records in relation to the Michigan Historic Commission, as well as the criminal code at MCL 750.491, relating to public records.

Now, the mandamus relief requested, like the complaint for declaratory relief, is similarly broad and general. The addendum or the "wherefore" request of the writ of mandamus asks the Court to order the township officials to comply with their constitutional, statutory and other lawful duties.

Now, specific allegations in Mr. Nannestad's complaint fall into two broad categories, as I read it. One is the alleged failure of the township officers to keep, to retain and provide certain documents and records under their control, including contracts, public grant documents, audit records, fixed asset ledgers, and specifically as to the treasurer, alleged

failure to keep, retain and provide certain financial records, including copies of the cashier's checks, regular non-cashier's checks, front and back, and related bank statements and township banking records.

Now, the amended complaint proposed by the plaintiff to be filed on motion is identical in its addendum or "wherefore" clause on the relief requested. The addendum to the proposed amended complaint, likewise as to the declaratory judgment relief, asks the Court to determine and declare the township officers are required to conform to their duties under the statutes I've already cited. And the mandamus relief again is identical to that in the original complaint, that is, a writ ordering the defendants to comply with their constitutional, statutory, and other legal duties as outlined in the declaratory judgment relief.

Now, the amended complaint, as I've considered it, and I've considered all of this on motion, both the -- both motions for summary as -- in relation to the Court's decision whether or not the complaint, by leave of Court, should be or can be amended. The amended complaint specifically alleges the township fails to have a written record retention policy and schedule. It also alleges with greater

specificity as to certain grant documents that have not been retained or requested, that the plaintiff asked to be provided to him, including the School Lake Grant, the Republic Iron Ore Trailhead Acquisition Grant, a water system project grant from the Department of Agriculture Rural Development Office, the Evergreen Street Improvement Grant, and the Hawks Drive Road Mitigation Grant. The amended complaint also adds in more specificity and detail, additional FOIA or Freedom of Information Act issues, including plaintiff's dissatisfaction that the township's response to the July 2012 FOIA requests for all computer receipts for purchases from a computer vendor, a Don Szenina, including invoices for hardware and software purchased from that vendor.

Other FOIA issues added to the mandamus complaint are plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the township's response to his request for bank records on a Youth Center fund account with the Range Bank, and the township's response to his requests for copies of the annual audit -- part of the annual audit report, specifically the F-65 report required by state law, as well as records relating to any accounts the township has with Hometown Bank. The amended complaint also asks for copies of any and all checks, front and back,

of any township funds drawn on or deposited in that
bank identified as Hometown Bank.

The amended complaint contends inter alia that the township's failure to maintain, keep and provide these public records is a violation of both any applicable state retention schedules as summed up here by counsel in oral argument, as well as the Freedom of Information Act. Finally the amended complaint contends, as I read it -- really asserts, and my reading of it is that the entire financial operations of the township, from its banking to its receipt and disbursement of funds and audits, is out of compliance with the uniform accounting requirements of the state treasurer as set forth in detail in the proposed amended complaint, in Averments 9A through G.

Touching on that for a moment on the question of the uniform accounting requirement and the statute, I did leave the MCLA book on my desk in -- It's actually on my side chambers I think -- on my side table in chambers, Mr. Dossetto.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: The plaintiff does assert that these failures of the township treasurer and other officers, who maintain -- according to the State Treasury requirements and the Uniform Accounting Act,

all are in violation of statutes that have already been cited, particularly those in the criminal code, as well as the Uniform Act.

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Now, at the same time the complaint for declaratory relief and mandamus was filed, on November 16 of 2012, plaintiff already had pending before this Court --

(Discussion off the record.)

THE COURT: Now, at the time this complaint -- the original complaint in this case for mandamus was filed, on November 16 of 2012, the plaintiff had already filed a FOIA complaint, and that was pending before the Court in this court's File 50327-CZ. And the trial of the issues on that FOIA complaint was underway. We had a series of hearings, a bench trial, that I think stretched from about September of 2012 into January of 2013. And those issues were underway. I believe in that I had granted the township's request for partial summary dismissal of some aspects of that FOIA complaint earlier. But in any event, the complete trial and hearing on that FOIA complaint was not yet completed when the plaintiff filed the present complaint with this court.

Now, the complaint for mandamus and

declaratory relief do include some of the very issues that were already pending before the Court in the FOIA action, particularly the request for and the township's response to records and contracts and other documents related to a firm known as U.P. Engineering & Architects, the F-65 audit reports for one particular year and that FOIA request, the inadequacy of response on cashier's check records and requests, bank statements, and the township's alleged failure to file a complete response to Mr. Nannestad's request for the general fixed asset ledger of the township. claims and the deficiency in responses in these claims, that were in the FOIA complaint already pending before the Court, are repeated again in Mr. Nannestad's proposed first amended complaint in this case, as well as some of them in the underlying original complaint.

Now, as I consider the averments of the complaint and the first amended complaint, as well as the responsive pleadings, briefs, documents and affidavits, and all of the exhibits submitted by both the plaintiff, as well as the township officials, first, as to these motions before the Court, I do not see any disputed material facts. Both parties seem in agreement on that, as well. The plaintiff moves for summary grant of his requested relief under

MCL 2.116(C)(10) and (9). And the defendant township officials contend in their motion that plaintiff's complaint and amended complaint fail to even state a claim for mandamus under 2.116(C)(8), and that plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action under 2.116(C)(5) or in the alternative (C)(8).

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Now, after careful consideration of the pleading, the complaint, and the proposed first amended complaint, what I regard as the undisputed facts, as well as the law cited by both counsel in this court, I come to the conclusion and I -- as part of that conclusion, the Court's decision is to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary disposition. I also find and conclude that the township officers' motion to dismiss the complaint, both as to mandamus and declaratory relief, is to be granted. Now, under the standards of MCR 2.116(I)(5) and 2.118, I also conclude that the first -- the proposed first amended complaint is not justified for the reason that -- and even considering the first amended complaint as filed, the Court comes to the same legal conclusion as it does on the first complaint filed in November of 2012 in its request for mandamus and declaratory relief.

Now, I reached these conclusions for the following reasons. First, as it relates to the

complaint now before the Court, its Averments 9, 10, 14, 15, 18 and 19 of the November 2012 complaint are averments and issues that related directly to those matters that were already the subject of plaintiff's complaint in the FOIA action that was then pending before the Court for trial, which had not yet been fully decided. And so I would certainly dismiss those aspects of the original complaint under MCR 2.116(C)(6).

Now, beyond that, as to the requested mandamus relief, first, in general, a writ of mandamus is a request that the Court order a public official, or potentially other corporate officials, but generally a public official to undertake a specific act that they are required to do. Now, the writ of mandamus and the relief of mandamus is an extraordinary and a discretionary writ. It is not a writ of right. It is discretionary with the Court, as set forth in Donovan versus Guy at 344 Mich 187, and the Board of Education versus the Superintendent of Public Instruction at 401 Mich 37, and as also discussed in an Upper Peninsula case, Iron County Board of Supervisors versus Crystal Falls, found at 23 Michigan Appeals 319.

Now, the right claimed in a mandamus complaint must be as to a specific duty owed to the

plaintiff, not a right possessed by citizens in general, as summarized in a case I believe cited by the defendant, the University Medical Affiliates, P.C., versus Wayne County Executive, at 142 Michigan Appeals 135, as well as People versus Young, at 220 Michigan Appeals 420. In his complaint, Mr. Nannestad claims nothing specific to himself, but only those general statutory rights belonging in some cases to the State of Michigan, and all of its citizens generally, such as the requirements of the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act, and the Freedom of Information Act in particular.

Now, in terms of harm specific to

Mr. Nannestad, he touched on this somewhat in a

discovery deposition taken by the township, he

complains of the burden of having to make FOIA demands

and to have -- and he had to file a FOIA complaint,

which this Court heard and did award him partial

relief, including a portion of his attorney fees,

although not all. He does cite about 22 percent of his

actual attorney fees were ordered to be reimbursed by

the Court. Now, that FOIA complaint, like this

mandamus complaint, had a similar broad stroke pattern

of multifaceted complaints of the township's FOIA

responses, spanning years, and almost all -- touching

on almost all aspects of the township operations. On that FOIA complaint, Mr. Nannestad prevailed on four or five of I think about eight or nine counts. The township prevailed on the remaining counts.

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Now, the duty sought to be enforced by mandamus must be plain. It must be clear and defined by law with such precision and certainty to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment, as summarized in Taylor versus Smith at 343 Mich 440. mandamus relief requested in these complaints, including the complaint now before the Court, as well as the proposed first amended complaint, is that the township officers generally comply with their duties of their office as set out in the statute. To issue such an order would involve this Court in the day-to-day operations of all aspects of the governance of Republic Township. A mandamus order that the township treasurer comply with his or her statutory duties would have the Court supervise the township officer daily in all aspects of her job, and that quite simply is not what is contemplated in a mandamus order, and indeed, if granted with this broad of relief, I would really have this judicial branch of government overreaching into the executive affairs of Republic Township.

And that is the exact concern touched on by

the Court of Appeals in the unpublished case cited by counsel for the defendant, Stackable versus Sergeant

Dahlke of the Lansing City Police Department. That was a Michigan Court of Appeals decision, unpublished. It was at the COA Docket 282174 at 2009 Michigan Appeals

Lexis at 1153. It was decided back in January 27 of '09. Now, as unpublished, it is certainly not controlling authority of the case, but I think its reasoning does make sense, and it is grounded on prior Michigan Supreme Court decisions.

In that case, the plaintiff brought a mandamus action against Sergeant David Dahlke individually and as an agent of the Lansing Police Department. The police requested -- The plaintiff, I should say, requested a writ of mandamus for the Lansing Police Department to issue parking tickets to vehicles parked in plaintiff's private parking lot without his consent. The trial court summarily dismissed the complaint, and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals held, and I quote from that decision, quote, Essentially, plaintiff argues that when read together, Lansing Ordinances... mandate that when an officer finds a vehicle parked without permission on private property, the officer has no

discretion to decide whether to issue a citation." Court of Appeals went on to say, "The use of a writ of mandamus to compel the police to enforce ordinances is addressed in Gowan v Smith, 157 Mich 443," a 1909 decision of the Supreme Court. "There, the Court determined that judicial interference was inappropriate because the Court was unwilling to participate in ongoing supervision of daily actions of the police and because the police commissioner is clothed with discretion in determining how to use his force to enforce the law." This holding -- Continuing in the quote, "This holding is consistent with 55 CJS," on the subject of mandamus, at Section 244, which states, quote, With respect to the enforcement of police regulations, mandamus is not an appropriate remedy to compel a general course of official conduct for a long series of continuous acts to be performed under varying conditions, unquote. Now, the end of that quote from the Stackable case.

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But I also indicate that the *Stackable* court also cited *Diamond Match Company versus Powers* at 51 Mich -- 51 Mich at page 145, an 1883 decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, in which the Supreme Court explained, quote, When the case presents a single occasion, and calls for an act which is presently

determined, it is entirely practicable" and direct -- I should say, "it is entirely practicable to direct the act by mandamus" be performed. "But where the case contemplates something continuous, yet variable in its conditions and aptitudes, the remedy by that process seems an unfit one, unquote.

And I might add as well, as an aside here, as it relates to this question of enforcement of police measures and the criminal code by mandamus, the statute that — on which plaintiff relies at 750.491, 492, and I think going over — well, 491, 492, these are part of the criminal code. Both of them create misdemeanors for certain alleged acts by public officers, and the misdemeanor acts alleged actually don't touch, as I read the statute, on the specific issues raised in the complaint here. But it is within the purview of the prosecuting attorney and the prosecutor's discretion whether or not to enforce the criminal code. And to that extent, to the extent those statutes are cited, very much like the issue set forth in the Stackable decision.

Now, continuing on here, given the broad nature of the relief sought here, and the reasons why this Court has come to the conclusion that

Mr. Nannestad's concerns are not enforceable by

mandamus from this Court, I can only cite by way of example I think what is typically more appropriate and considered for mandamus relief. For example, if Mr. Nannestad or any other citizen were to apply in the township for a zoning compliance permit, he fills it out, all the paperwork, pays his filing fee, submits it to the zoning official, and the zoning official simply refuses to act on it, doesn't grant it, doesn't deny it, just doesn't do anything with it, doesn't do anything with it because maybe the zoning official doesn't like whoever filed the permit. The citizen under those circumstances has a clear right to a decision on the application, and such an explicit failure to act by a township officer, mandamus is entirely an appropriate remedy to get the act on that decision. But again, to grant the relief requested here would have this Court essentially take over and supervise the township officials in the day-to-day functions of their office as it relates to their public recordkeeping.

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As to the claim in more detail that the township officials have not been keeping accounting and financial records as required by the State Treasury

Department and the State Uniform Budget and Accounting

Act, the law is clear in this Court's judgment that

Mr. Nannestad lacks standing to press those claims in particular. First, it has long been the law of this court, going back as far as the 1920s, that to have standing for mandamus, the plaintiff must show an interest beyond that of a citizen generally interested in enforcing the laws, particularly as to public accounting laws.

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In Nowack versus Auditor General at 243 Michigan 200 (1928), the Michigan Supreme Court held as the law existed at that time, quote from that decision, quoting, so in the instant case, the plaintiff, as a citizen and taxpayer, has a common law right to inspect the public records in the auditor general's office. And that, you might say, as an aside here, but went to the records of the State Auditor General himself or herself, whoever it may have been -- to determine if the public money is being properly expended. It is a right that belongs to his citizenship. It is a right which he enjoys in common with all other citizens, a public right which can be enforced only by mandamus proceeding brought by the Attorney General. It is not and has never been the policy of law to permit private individuals to use the writ of mandamus against public officers except in cases where they had some special interest not possessed by the citizens generally. And

there the Michigan Supreme Court cited Smith versus

City of Saginaw at 81 Mich 123.

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Now, in that case, just so it's not misread should this matter go up on appeal, ultimately the plaintiff was found to have such a special right and did get access. Of course, this case was long before the Freedom of Information Act. There was no such statute on the book. And -- But he did find -- The Supreme Court did find that the plaintiff, Mr. Nowack, in that case had such a special interest. They went on to say, the plaintiff has not sought to enforce his rights to the Office of Attorney General. He has begun this suit in his own name. In order to maintain it, he must show that he has a special interest not possessed by the citizens generally. And in this particular case, the court also found that the plaintiff, as an owner and a publisher and an editor of a newspaper, showed that he had been hampered and injured in his business of publishing news by the refusal of the defendant Auditor General to allow him to inspect the records in his office. And the court found that, in plaintiff's position, he did have a special interest to entitle him to the aid of the courts by writ of mandamus.

Now, in this case, Mr. Nannestad has made no

such showing. He is an interested and vigorous citizen of Republic Township, and a taxpayer, and he stands with all of his fellow citizens and taxpayers, but he doesn't rise above them because of his level of interest and willingness to spend his own personal money to bring these suits.

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Now, the holding of *Nowack* that a mandamus plaintiff must show a specific special interest sought to be protected by mandamus continues, in this Court's judgment, to the present time, as found in Booth Newspapers versus Muskegon Probate Judge at 15 Michigan Appeals 203, which held and cited, quoting again from the Booth Newspapers case, "The case of Nowack v. Auditor General...remains the definitive law of this State and has been employed by other jurisdictions to assist in resolving problems similar to the present one...When his request was denied, he sought --" referring to the plaintiff in that case, "-- he sought remedy by a writ of mandamus not through the office of the attorney general, but in his own name, which required that he show a 'special interest' not possessed by the citizens generally."

Most recently, specifically to the State
Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act, under which the
manual that the plaintiff cites here is founded -- And

that statute is at MCL 141.421. On this issue, the Court of Appeals and the 46th Circuit Court, which is Crawford County, at 266 Michigan Appeals 150, among many other holdings, held that only parties with standing to bring an action under the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act — the only parties, if I can restate this again, with standing to bring an action under the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act are the Attorney General and the prosecuting attorney. And that is explicitly set forth in the statute and — as it relates to enforcement of that Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act at MCL 141.431.

Now, so it's clear, again, should this matter go up on appeal, the 46th Circuit Court, which is Crawford County, the Court of Appeals was ultimately reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court, at Volume 476. I don't have the specific cite in front of me. At issue in that case is whether a multi-county circuit county, Otsego, Crawford, and whatever counties are part of the 46th Circuit, whether or not they were adequately budgeting and funding 46th Circuit Court operations. The Court of Appeals held they were not for reasons that are somewhat unrelated to this aspect of their holding. It went up to the Supreme Court.

concluded that the counties did make a showing that they were providing funding at a serviceable letter -- level, and the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals was reversed. However, the language and the reading of the Court of Appeals of the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act I think certainly remains persuasive, and it is consistent with the plain clear letter of the statute. This is a statewide law mandating certain budgeting and accounting standards for all units of government in the State of Michigan, and it refers to enforcement by the prosecutor and the Attorney General, and it makes sense where those would lie.

Now, to the extent a citizen may have claimed a special or unique harm as a result of failure to comply with the act, I think in light of all of the law I've cited, that citizen may well have standing, but I don't see any such claim set forth in Mr. Nannestad's pleading.

Now, Mr. Nannestad does have, as I've already commented, broad and longstanding, and in many ways well thought out concerns from a citizen's standpoint about the efficacy of his township government and governance. However, the plaintiff's efforts to involve the courts in supervising and running the day-to-day operations of the township officials does

not present, in this Court's judgment, a justiciable issue capable of court remedy by mandamus, which would really -- in the relief requested, as I said, would have this Court supervising and running the township.

And I believe, for all of the cases that I've cited here, the common law of mandamus makes this clear.

Mr. Nannestad is not without remedy. He continues to exercise and has all of his rights under the Freedom of Information Act statute. He continues and has all of his rights under the Open Meetings Law. He has rights under the election laws, rights of recall, rights of petition. He has First Amendment rights of addressing himself publicly to concerns about the township. If he thinks the current elected officials are not appropriately running the township, these are all remedies where the concerns that Mr. Nannestad has are better placed rather in the courts in trying to detail those issues. So it is for these reasons and conclusions that the township's motion for summary dismissal of the mandamus complaint is granted.

The proposed amended complaint, I've considered it, and read it, and decided whether or not justice would require or permit amendment of the complaint. But it repeats, in some aspects, the claims

of the original complaint, and in other aspects adds on almost entirely new complaints for mandamus with new factual allegations. Nonetheless, in this Court's judgment, it presents the same problems the Court finds in the original pleading. Mr. Nannestad broadly seeks compliance with the many laws under which the township officials generally act without claiming specific injury or loss or -- of any interest of his own that's harmed by those actions.

He similarly brings in the proposed amended complaint claims under the Uniform Budgeting and Accounting Act that are reserved specifically for action by the Attorney General or prosecuting attorney on behalf of all of the people of the State of Michigan. Whether the Court considers the original complaint as filed, or even having considered the first amended complaint as having been filed on leave granted, I come to the same conclusion as it relates to these pleadings.

Finally, the Court also grants summary dismissal of the complaint -- the plaintiff's complaint for declaratory relief, though granting of declaratory relief is discretionary with the Court, and declaratory relief can only be granted where there is an actual case of controversy capable of judicial resolution, as

summarized in Shavers versus Attorney General at 402 Mich 554, and Rott, R-O-T-T, versus Standard Accident Insurance Company at 299 Mich App 384. The declaratory relief sought by the plaintiff in the end, and not to diminish it in any way, but in terms of judicial relief is — the only word I could come to is meaningless. He asks the Court to enter a judgment and order declaring and determining that the township official must comply with their statutory duties and oaths of office. That's an absolute given and a matter of law, and it does not require a judgment of this Court to so declare.

Township think these officials are not complying with their statutory duties and oaths of office, again the remedy is at the ballot box, the First Amendment, and rights of redress, and the other tools that are available to citizens under the Freedom of Information Act, of which Mr. Nannestad has sought, and which this Court has partially granted relief to him, and the tool of the rights under the Open Meetings Act, and other avenues of citizen involvement in government, but not here in the courtroom. This Court cannot reasonably declare the rights and relationship of these parties as to any specific case of controversy in the form pleaded

1	by the plaintiff.
2	So in the exercise of discretion, the
3	complaint for declaratory relief is likewise dismissed.
4	The township I find to be the prevailing party on all
5	issues in this matter, and I will award the statutory
6	costs. So that is the Court's decision. I'll prepare
7	a short order consistent with that decision for reasons
8	stated on the record.
9	I have other parties in the courtroom that
10	have been waiting for a three o'clock hearing. If
11	there is a request for clarification or
12	reconsideration, of course the parties have such
13	rights, but I do intend, with dispatch here, to move on
14	to the next trial. So we'll stand in recess.
15	* * * *
16	(The hearing concluded at about 4:05 p.m.)
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
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     COUNTY OF MARQUETTE )
          I certify that this transcript, consisting of 27 pages,
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     is a complete, true, and correct transcript of the
 4
     proceedings and testimony taken in this case on October 10,
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     2013.
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                         Sharon A. Grabarczyk, CER 6727
     Date
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                         Northern Reporters
                          P.O. Box 27
                         Marquette, MI 49855
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